Special Operations Forces After Kosovo by Dunlap, Charles J., Jr.
T o many observers the NATO air cam-paign against Serbia in the spring of1999 represents the future face of war.The long-distance, high-tech applica-
tion of force is an attractive template as the
United States and other nations become ever
more casualty-averse. Indeed, Allied Force was
the first major operation in which aircraft
achieved victory without the need for a land
campaign. What really encouraged airpower en-
thusiasts was the apparent vindication of
decades-old theories that air attacks could
achieve a psychological effect on an enemy that
would force it to yield even when its military re-
mained in the field able to resist.
Allied Force was a manifestation of the revo-
lution in military affairs (RMA). Several types of
aircraft dropped precision-guided munitions
(PGMs) on urban areas with astonishing accu-
racy, save for a few well-publicized miscues. In
fact, PGMs constituted the bulk of the weapons
used, continuing an RMA-derived trend begun in
the Persian Gulf War. Advanced command and
control platforms such as the airborne warning
and control system (AWACS) and joint surveil-
lance target attack radar system (JSTARS)—pre-
viewed during Operation Desert Storm—allowed
perceptions of the battlespace to reach new lev-
els, especially when combined with information
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from surveillance satellites and augmented by
unmanned aeronautical reconnaissance vehicles
such as Predator.
At first blush the achievements of high-tech
warfare demonstrated during Allied Force may be
troubling for Special Operations Forces (SOF). Of
the principal SOF missions, three of the most im-
portant and most leg-
endary could face techno-
logical shrinkage if not
obsolescence: direct ac-
tion, special reconnais-
sance, and unconven-
tional warfare. What is
the role of the special operator when PGMs can
strike high-value targets with relative impunity
and effective and pervasive surveillance systems
can produce battlefield intelligence without risk-
ing lives? Likewise, technology may have a seri-
ous impact on traditional SOF peacetime mis-
sions. Although other nations once viewed SOF
trainers as essential in improving their armed
forces, technology may render that need superflu-
ous. This is particularly true as inexpensive, user-
friendly software makes operating complex
weapons systems relatively simple, thereby obvi-
ating the need for training. Software innovations
bring self-paced computer-assisted instruction
within reach of poor countries. Basic infantry
skills can be learned from a computer program
which costs less than $50.
Although Special Operations Forces will not
disappear any time soon, one cannot assume that
they will be unaffected by new technology or the
post-Cold War landscape. They will change or at-
rophy. It is not enough to inculcate new devices
piecemeal into existing mission concepts to meet
such challenges; instead, the SOF community
needs to fundamentally reconsider how it will fit
into the 21st century security architecture.
In Search of the Warrior Ethos
Since the Persian Gulf War, much SOF dy-
namism has gone to what may not be considered
classic warfighting. Nonwarfighting missions
have grown in scope and importance. While
these missions are critical, they cannot maintain
Special Operations Forces as organized today. De-
spite interservice squabbling, the Armed Forces
are bonded in the end by the mutual respect of
comrades who go into harm’s way together. Spe-
cial Operations Forces lose relevance when alien-
ated from the defense community. Absent a real-
istic warfighting role, they could become
marginalized.
At the same time, the American way of war
today suggests that SOF combat missions may be a
thing of the past. Few commanders will seriously
contemplate ordering a direct action mission
against a high-value target if it can be destroyed
with standoff systems. As Allied Force illustrates,
commanders will readily look to other options in
the future, including robotic platforms.
While strikes by Special Operations Forces
against command and control nodes and similar
targets will become increasingly rare, it does not
necessarily follow that the end of the fabled di-
rect action missions is at hand. No matter how
casualty-averse decisionmakers have become,
there are times in any conflict when American
lives are in jeopardy. Allied Force highlighted
such an occasion—a prisoner of war rescue. Three
soldiers captured early in the conflict became
pawns in a diplomatic game. Although they were
eventually released, intense media exposure
demonstrated a tool which an enemy can use to
mold public opinion. Given the manipulation of
American prisoners by North Vietnam, clumsy ef-
forts by Saddam Hussein to leverage captives in
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the Gulf War, and the recent detention by China
of EP–3 crew members, the United States should
anticipate similar episodes.
Decisionmakers must prevent an enemy
from gaining advantage with captives. An obvi-
ous solution would be a robust rescue capability.
Theoretically, Special Operations Forces can per-
form such missions through combat search and
rescue (CSAR). But what is required is not neces-
sarily an operation with the immediacy of CSAR,
but rather one of greater dimensions aimed at
rescuing incarcerated personnel. But when such
operations have been mounted, organization
and planning were done on an ad hoc basis and
the results were usually disastrous. Large-scale
operations have not been the centerpiece of fo-
cused, dedicated SOF assets, but forces should be
organized, trained, and equipped for that
mission now. Such raids may require new capa-
bilities such as non-lethal weapons to minimize
friendly casualties and encourage inventive
ingress and egress methods.
A parallel benefit to a stronger snatch capa-
bility would be a potential to hold enemy leaders
at risk, not necessarily through physical destruc-
tion but rather by enforcing the rule of law. Many
observers agree that one reason no pro-Nazi re-
sistance movement emerged in Germany after
World War II was the Nuremberg trials. Trying
Nazi leaders and exposing their evil deeds to the
German public in detail aborted any nascent defi-
ance of the Allied occupation. The same effect
can be noted in Panama with the capture and
trial of Manuel Noriega on drug charges.
Conversely, putting enemy leaders to death
can create martyrs and further resistance. The
death of Che Guevara at the hands of Bolivian
troops in 1967 turned him into a cult hero who is
still revered by leftists. Obviously, the capture of
well-guarded enemy leaders deep in their territory
is a challenging task demanding an extraordinar-
ily disciplined and skilled force. This capability is
especially valued when Western interests are
served by bringing villains to trial. Moreover, it
plays to the existing strengths of Special Opera-
tions Forces.
Shadow War
Facilitating unconventional warfare is an-
other SOF core competency that some might
think has been superseded by Allied Force. Politi-
cal imperatives curtailed the role Special Opera-
tions Forces might otherwise have played. The de-
cision was made to minimize contacts with the
Kosovo Liberation Army. Similar constraints may
be anticipated in the future. The Nation will be
reluctant to align itself with groups that pursue
controversial agendas, especially when fueled by
ethnic or religious hatred. This factor, along with
a growing desire to not risk SOF losses unless ab-
solutely necessary, means there will be relatively
few opportunities to organize indigenous forces
behind enemy lines.
Nevertheless, unconventional warfare is per-
tinent to commanders of conventional forces.
The Air Force, for example, expended consider-
able resources in developing small footprint for-
ward air operations centers (AOCs). Replacing
people with such technology means deploying
much faster and beginning air operations sooner.
But flexibility comes at a price. The smaller num-
bers make AOCs—the critical linchpins of air
campaigns—less durable and thus extremely vul-
nerable as high-value targets. As attacks on the
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Marine barracks in Beirut, Khobar Towers, and
USS Cole demonstrated, even weak enemies can
strike defended targets. Surprisingly, few AOCs
are hardened or have plans to be.
Role playing also can help identify limita-
tions and vulnerabilities. Red teaming by Special
Operations Forces could draw not only on its
generic unconventional warfare proficiency but
also on its expertise in the culture and mindset
of specific threats, providing a realistic assess-
ment of a too-often
overlooked aspect of
modern air operations.
Such factors sug-
gest an enhanced SOF
role in intelligence
analysis and strategic
planning. For example,
getting the right kind of insight into enemy
thinking has bedeviled airpower planners for
years. Consider the following remark by Lieu-
tenant General Charles Horner, who commanded
U.S. air forces during the Gulf War:
Our peacetime-trained intelligence organizations are
taught never to be wrong. They like numbers and don’t
like to talk about what the other guy is thinking. They
don’t predict, they just give you the rundown, like TV
news anchors. Yet as a commander I had to think
about what the other guy was thinking. I needed to get
inside the other guy in order to find ways to spoil his
plans and make his worst fears come true.1
Failures in this regard result in the misapplication
of airpower.
There is no indication that traditional intelli-
gence organizations can meet analytical needs of
decisionmakers. Special Operations Forces, how-
ever, are peculiarly well situated to fill the void.
They are trained to think like an adversary and
are adept at infusing their analysis with the his-
torical and cultural context of a particular enemy
worldview. This point of view would be invalu-
able to conventional warfighters, especially when
facing unconventional threats.
As a case in point, one purpose of deploying
Apache helicopters during Allied Force was to cre-
ate fear of a ground assault in the minds of the
enemy, driving it to coalesce its forces into lucra-
tive targets for air attacks and other standoff fires.
Regrettably, there is little evidence that it had
that effect. Imbued with an understanding of the
Serb mind, Special Operations Forces might have
suggested that NATO organize the deployment or
exercise of Turkish troops. That might have gen-
uinely alarmed Belgrade, for whom defeat at the
hands of the Turks in 1389 is not just an histori-
cal footnote but part of the Serb psyche. Most
conventional commanders think in terms of what
makes sense in modern, parochial contexts; the
unconventional warrior readily draws upon his-
torical and cultural analogies that are all but in-
visible to others.
A Different Path 
To make unique contributions in the future,
Special Operations Forces must participate in the
planning process. Beyond CSAR, they are largely
limited to responding to the targeting plans pro-
duced by others rather than actively deciding
what should be targeted. Yet they have the clear-
est understanding in the military of warfare as es-
sentially imposing one’s will on an enemy. Much
conventional strategic thinking by airpower ad-
vocates overemphasizes coercion through denial,
which in essence requires reducing capabilities to
the point where an enemy can no longer use
force. The viability of such strategy in 21st century
warfare is plainly suspect.
The oft-understated lesson of Allied Force is
that the quantum of combat power that must be
brought to bear on the adversary to render his
military capability physically ineffective simply
may not be politically possible. Walter Boyne pre-
dicted as much, stating that the American public
demands that “we must win our wars with a mini-
mum of casualties inflicted upon the enemy.”2
Thus the SOF expertise in identifying psychologi-
cal vulnerabilities that may not require the same
level of destruction as coercion through denial is
exactly the kind of talent conventional command-
ers will need in politically sensitive conflicts.
Similarly, psychological operations (PSYOP)
must be reexamined in light of Allied Force.
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Many experts believe the Serbs won the informa-
tion war.3 The reasons for this conclusion include
the fact that SOF resources were relatively limited.
The inventory of Commando Solo aircraft, the
platform that broadcasts radio and television pro-
gramming into enemy or denied areas, is only
four planes. But more critical is finding the cre-
ative personnel with expertise for the PSYOP mis-
sion. It is not clear that it is feasible for Special
Operations Forces to recruit and retain the talent
needed to produce effective 21st century PSYOP
products even within the Reserve components.
PSYOP is clearly a function in which America
should dominate. The United States created
Madison Avenue and the advertising techniques
that have proven effective worldwide. Special Op-
erations Forces must develop better ways to tap
into what should be an obvious asymmetrical ad-
vantage for this country. That may require greater
reliance on contractors and other commercial
sources to produce media that work against mod-
ern and modernizing societies. Even if much of
the development of material is contracted out to
private vendors, the process must remain under
the aegis of Special Operations Forces.
Thus to the extent SOF units engage in infor-
mation operations in the psychological warfare
context, continued emphasis on this area makes
sense. However, it would be improper for Special
Operations Forces to create a capability to con-
duct computer network attack operations, a mis-
sion recently and appropriately given to U.S.
Space Command.
Engagement Blues
As Special Operations Forces seek to enhance
their warfighting utility, the pull of military oper-
ations other than war remains powerful. The
question becomes one of prioritization. Although
it is difficult to anticipate the next hot spot, there
is no value in expending resources on a training
mission simply because it offers an opportunity
for military-to-military engagement. Neverthe-
less, Special Operations Forces may come under
pressure from the Department of State to con-
tinue or even increase their presence in certain
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nations. Ambassadors and country teams working
on the margins of national interests have little
chance of competing for foreign aid. Thus SOF as-
sets may represent the best, perhaps only, oppor-
tunity for U.S. representatives to provide host na-
tions with American largess. If those resources
were unconstrained, there could be merit in hon-
oring such requests under some kind of expanded
global scout concept, but not in an era of fiscal
austerity. Pressures to do more with less and place
a premium on engagement must be resisted.
Beyond resources, there is the issue of focus.
Diffusion of energy is a continuing threat to the
small SOF community. Accordingly, its leaders
may want to exercise considerable discipline re-
garding the scope and intensity of peacetime op-
erations. For example, Special Operations Forces
should be relieved of coun-
terdrug missions when pos-
sible. The reasons include
the fact that U.S. policy may
be headed toward a less ag-
gressive interdiction mode.
More importantly, it is the
risk of military participation in what is essentially
a law enforcement effort. There are relatively few
historical cases of military organizations that
have successfully performed law enforcement
missions without compromising either warfight-
ing ability or democratic liberties. Counterdrug
missions, which are inherently tied to a rights-
oriented criminal justice system, leave SOF assets
vulnerable to losing the public support they need.
Likewise, the civil affairs mission deserves to
be reconsidered. Conceptually, the capability ex-
ists to administer occupied enemy territories as
required by international law. In practical terms,
it has become the preferred diplomatic fix for a
range of failed and failing states. The problems of
such states are deeper and longer-term than civil
affairs can be expected to solve. If ever there was
a function worthy of civilianization and privati-
zation, civil affairs—beyond those needed for
bona fide military purposes—is it. Besides practi-
cal issues, remarkably little consideration is given
to the concept of civil affairs at present. The mes-
sage America sends to fledgling democracies
should not be to put the military in charge. But
this seems to be the case when civil affairs units
are tasked to rebuild broken countries.
Notwithstanding the changes that Allied
Force portends, Special Operations Forces do have
a bright future so long as they show the flexibility
to accept change. That future may be tied more to
direct action and other warfighting competencies
than a cursory analysis of the operation might
imply. Like any enterprise, the SOF community
has its own constituencies, clans, and rice bowls.
Furthermore, having evolved in a larger, often un-
friendly military environment, SOF capabilities,
including those earmarked here for either deem-
phasis or elimination, are adept at self-preserva-
tion. Consequently, change may not come easily,
and fierce bureaucratic struggles loom . 
Nevertheless, change must come. Even
staunch advocates realize that technology is creat-
ing new challenges and opportunities for every
component of the military. Those that refuse to
change may find themselves caught in a tailspin of
decline. Special Operations Forces were established
as an innovative solution to global military and
political conditions. In important respects, there-
fore, their very roots are founded in adaptability.
The revolution in military affairs has stimu-
lated change and Special Operations Forces must
evolve once again. The stakes are high; only by
leveraging these special capabilities can the Na-
tion fully meet the security demands of the new
millennium. JFQ
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